> The main area of noncooperation with the United States
> [was] resistance to repeated United States efforts to
> ... open its market more to foreign goods and to change
> other economic practices seen as adverse to United
> States economic interests.
> The relative economic power ... was undergoing sweeping
> change ... This change went well beyond the implications
> of the United States trade deficit ... The persisting
> United States trade and budget deficits ...
> led to a series of decisions in the middle of the decade
> that brought a major realignment of the value of ...
> currencies ... the ability to purchase more United States
> goods and to make important investments in the United
> States [resulting in them being] the main international
> creditor.
> ... growing investment in the United States ... led to
> complaints from some American constituencies ... seemed well
> positioned to use its economic power to invest in the
> high-technology products in which United States ... were
> still leaders. The United States's ability to compete under
> these circumstances was seen by many ... as hampered by heavy
> personal, government, and business debt and a low savings rate.
China since the turn of the millennium? No, Japan in the 1980s.
I am (and I suspect most of the readership is) too young to remember the fear the US felt about Japan in the 1980s, but a dense, ageing population and arguable a cultural rigidity capped growth.
I am (and I suspect most of the readership is) too young to remember the fear the US felt about Japan in the 1980s, but a dense, ageing population and arguable a cultural rigidity capped growth.