> The FBI ran a sting operation in Europe where they created their own 'secure' phone and messaging platform. Their OS used portions of our code and was heavily marketed as being GrapheneOS or based on GrapheneOS.
So how do we know GrapheneOS itself isn't a honeypot? It's run by a mystery org and heavily marketed as being a secure platform.
They even have reproduceable builds so you can validate the source matches the distributed binaries. After that it's trusting in the OSS process to have caught any attempted backdoors which is more down to your individual evaluations.
Would be an interesting experiment actually: how long would it take for the community at large to discover a backdoor in graphene OS if added sneakily by generally trusted Devs, ie the org that maintains it.
Or, phrased differently, how much independent auditing is graphene OS subjected to?
> We've built relationships with security researchers and organizations interested in GrapheneOS or using it which results in a lot of this kind of collaboration.
You are clearly talking out of your ass. I couldn't care less on your baseless and outright stupid arguments. Have fun running stock or some shitty custom rom
> The FBI ran a sting operation in Europe where they created their own 'secure' phone and messaging platform. Their OS used portions of our code and was heavily marketed as being GrapheneOS or based on GrapheneOS.
So how do we know GrapheneOS itself isn't a honeypot? It's run by a mystery org and heavily marketed as being a secure platform.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_AG was a CIA front for 50 years.