> Chevron deference never meant agencies can just make up and pass law
Not on it's own, no. The bigger culprit there is the erosion of the nondelegation doctrine. But Chevron aggravated the problem by allowing agencies to stretch their authority beyond what even congress intended with little possibility of legal challenge.
Interpreting the law is and should be the role of the courts, not the role of the agencies that that law is supposed to be governing. It'd be like if we passed a law intended to regulate insurance companies, and the courts decided to give deference to the insurance company's interpretation of that law because "they're the experts on insurance".
You could always argue in court that the agency’s interpretation of the statute was not reasonable. The court could always agree with you and establish case law against that interpretation.
It was a two part test:
1. Is the statute clear? If so, defer to statute. Otherwise, go to (2).
2. Is the agency’s interpretation reasonable? If so, defer to agency. Otherwise, the agency's rule is no longer enforceable.
Now, the court is allowed to come up with its own interpretation even in the presence of a reasonable agency interpretation. That is the only change. If the agency's interpretation was unreasonable, then it was already going to get thrown out.
The courts took the authority to throw out interpretations that they themselves (the court!) think are reasonable. Unreasonable interpretations were NEVER protected by Chevron deference.
Correct, that's why I said "little possibility of legal challenge" not "no possibility of legal challenge". Proving something is "not reasonable" in a legal sense is a pretty high bar to clear. The point still stands.
There's ample possibility of legal challenge. There was a low possibility of legal overturn for one specific reason: courts generally agreed that agencies' interpretations were reasonable.
> Proving something is "not reasonable" in a legal sense is a pretty high bar to clear
Sure it is, but that is literally not the bar. The courts always had the authority to do their own analysis of reasonableness so long as the challenger raised the question. In fact, they didn't just have the authority to do it, they were obligated to do it.
The low probability of overturn is an argument for Chevron deference. It is empirical proof that courts almost always found agencies' rules to be reasonable interpretations.
The fact that they're analyzing the reasonableness of the agencies' interpretations and not the correctness of their interpretations is precisely the problem. There are a lot of possible interpretations of the law that are reasonable but not correct. The judiciary's job is supposed to be to interpret the law, not just to decide whether defendant's own personal interpretation meets some minimum bar of reasonableness.
Correct according to the mechanism our constitution defines for resolving disputes about the interpretation of law: the judgement of the court system. A judgement which they were not allowed to make under Cheveron, because they were limited to evaluating the reasonableness of the agency's own personal interpretation.
You’re aware that the Chevron SCOTUS decision was itself part of this exact Constitutional system, right? As was the overturning of Chevron.
I.e. you’re going to need a better rubric.
"The agency's own personal interpretation" is another nonsense phrase where you're trying to simply presume your opinion alongside a weak argument. The agency is not a person.
I'm making perfectly reasonable arguments; you're the one who's talking nonsense. If there's something you think I have yet to prove why don't you say what it is instead of just calling my arguments weak without offering any counter?
>I.e. you’re going to need a better rubric.
I see nothing wrong with the rubric I gave. It's the one the constitution set up, and therefore 100% correct from a legal perspective. Past courts having different opinions from the current one is irrelevant to that.
> The agency's own personal interpretation" is another nonsense phrase
No, it means exactly what is says. The agency has its own interpretation which has and ought to have no more legal weight than a random person's. If it's just the word "personal" you're objecting to, that's obviously a figure of speech that doesn't alter the substance of my argument.
An agency is an agency, not a court. They have exactly zero constitutionally granted authority to interpret law. Why in your view should their opinion on the law have any more weight than yours or mine, or than any other person's personal interpretation? Or more importantly, more weight than the courts; the institution created for the very purpose of interpreting the law? Because it seems very obvious to me that it shouldn't. Especially in the context of a lawsuit to which the agency is one of the parties.
> It's the one the constitution set up, and therefore 100% correct from a legal perspective. Past courts having different opinions from the current one is irrelevant to that.
Okay so on June 27, 2024, the "100% correct from a legal perspective" was that courts defer to agencies when they have reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
On June 28, 2024, the "100% correct from a legal perspective" was that courts should not defer to agencies when they have reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
Each of these decisions define which structure "the Constitution set up." This fact is itself defined in the Constitution.
Your argument that this is a good decision because it's "Constitutionally correct" is literally just begging the question. It is an entirely circular argument that could just as easily have been applied to defend Chevron. If your argument can be used to defend either side of it, it's a bad argument.
When I say things like "the courts are the mechanism our constitution defines for resolving disputes about the interpretation of law", I am making a principled argument based on my understanding of the Constitution and the Separation of Powers, not based on anything the Supreme Court has or has not said.
The United States Constitution defines three separate branches of government:
1. The Legislative Branch, which makes law
2. The Judicial Branch, which interprets law
3. The Executive Branch, which enforces law
These branches are intentionally separated from each other to prevent the concentration of power, and so that each branch can serve as a check and balance on the powers of the other branches.
Government agencies are part of the Executive Branch, which enforces law. They are not part of the Judicial Branch, which interprets law. Therefore, they should not have a role in interpreting the law, and granting them that power breaks this simple fundamental principle of the Constitution.
This is civics 101 level stuff. It doesn't seem like it should be controversial to me, which is why I've been asserting it as true without feeling the need to try to justify my points beyond those assertions.
The thing is: if Congress thinks executive branch agencies are interpreting laws in ways they didn't intend, they can change the law to clarify their intent. If they fail to do so, I have to assume the agencies are doing what Congress intended. But the supreme Court evidently disagrees.
Only with the willing cooperation of the executive branch, or a veto proof majority in both houses. Otherwise the very executive they are trying to reign in could just veto the bill to allow the agencies to continue overstepping their authority.
But that's beside the point anyway, because it shouldn't have to be the legislature's job to be constantly weighing in on whether an agency is following the law as written. That's literally what the courts are for; to interpret nuances of the law.
The US is rich for many reasons that have little to do with being well governed.
* The country was launched on most of a century of essentially "free" land grabs-- limited pushback from native civilizations. buying cheap from distressed foreign powers (Louisiana), the main wars of conquest being insignificant squabbles with Mexico over trifles.
* Said land was also compelling-- you weren't fighting the environment to extract value the way you would be in Siberia.
* After 1865, no significant nation-scale conflict on the territory itself to blow down existing investments.
* This created an opportunity for bulk immigration-- first with Homestead Act style programmes and then because the American economy was compelling enough to be a pull by itself. A high immigrant population has a unique "opt-in" demographics-- a situation that self-selects for entrepeneurialism.
None of this required wildly competent government. George Washington could have chosen to be a king, a religious caliph, or a protosocialist planning enthusiast, and the deck would have still held almost all the same cards.
That's an irrelevant distinction. Neither are part of the judicial branch, which is the relevant consideration here.
Consider: Congress passes a law which sets limits on the authority of an agency. You think the agency itself should get to decide what that law actually means? And the courts, the branch of government specifically granted the role of arbiter by our constitution, should be required to differ to that interpretation if anyone ever objects and brings a lawsuit? It's absurd, and no less so than if the law was concerning a private company rather than a public agency.
Not on it's own, no. The bigger culprit there is the erosion of the nondelegation doctrine. But Chevron aggravated the problem by allowing agencies to stretch their authority beyond what even congress intended with little possibility of legal challenge.
Interpreting the law is and should be the role of the courts, not the role of the agencies that that law is supposed to be governing. It'd be like if we passed a law intended to regulate insurance companies, and the courts decided to give deference to the insurance company's interpretation of that law because "they're the experts on insurance".