> Idealism is still compatible with the material world, but it seems futile to search for “the experiencer” within the experience itself.
You're right, that's why the concept of "the experiencer" is ultimately an illusion. It's the same sort of illusion as "tables" and "a day job". None of these concepts fundamentally exist in physics, they are labels we apply to loosely defined categories of observations.
Ultimately, Descartes was wrong, "I think therefore I am" is false because it's circular; it assumes the existence of "I" to conclude that "I" exists. The fallacy-free version is "this is a thought therefore thoughts exist", and as you can see, no "I" can be inferred.
If you want to understand what sort of answer neuroscience is starting to provide to the hard problem, I recommend this paper:
You're right, that's why the concept of "the experiencer" is ultimately an illusion. It's the same sort of illusion as "tables" and "a day job". None of these concepts fundamentally exist in physics, they are labels we apply to loosely defined categories of observations.
Ultimately, Descartes was wrong, "I think therefore I am" is false because it's circular; it assumes the existence of "I" to conclude that "I" exists. The fallacy-free version is "this is a thought therefore thoughts exist", and as you can see, no "I" can be inferred.
If you want to understand what sort of answer neuroscience is starting to provide to the hard problem, I recommend this paper:
A conceptual framework for consciousness, https://pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2116933119