First, standard disclaimer on this topic that there were multiple independent technologies announced - I assume you are speaking to content hash comparisons on photo upload specifically to Apple's photo service, which they are doing on-device vs in-cloud.
How is this situation different from an oppressive government "asking" (which is a weird way we now use to describe compliance with laws/regulations) for this sort of scanning in the future?
Apple's legal liability and social concerns would remain the same. So would the concerns of people under the regime. Presumably the same level of notification and ability of people to fight this new regulation would also be present in both cases.
Also, how is this feature worse than other providers which already do this sort of scanning on the other side of the client/server divide? Presumably Apple does it this way so that the photos remain encrypted on the server, and release of data encryption keys is a controlled/auditable event.
You would think the EFF would understand that you can't use technical measures to either fully enforce or successfully defeat regulatory measures.
How is this situation different from an oppressive government "asking" (which is a weird way we now use to describe compliance with laws/regulations) for this sort of scanning in the future?
Apple's legal liability and social concerns would remain the same. So would the concerns of people under the regime. Presumably the same level of notification and ability of people to fight this new regulation would also be present in both cases.
Also, how is this feature worse than other providers which already do this sort of scanning on the other side of the client/server divide? Presumably Apple does it this way so that the photos remain encrypted on the server, and release of data encryption keys is a controlled/auditable event.
You would think the EFF would understand that you can't use technical measures to either fully enforce or successfully defeat regulatory measures.