Maybe the point is that central power is always indirect through manipulation of information and financial incentive, the definition of finance being a centralized accumulation of future benefit. Direct power would be to hold a gun to someone’s head and tell them to do something. But the same power doesn’t go along with an email. The power of that email is complicated because it depends on what specific threats or benefits are promised, and how it is measured, and by whom. So it’s very easy for a system of incentives to directly contradict the command given by a policy. For instance, if I tell everybody to nominate the worst performer on their team, who will be fired by popular vote every week, it won’t be long before they all wise up and start voting in their own best interests, which will either be the top performer, or the least loyal to themselves, which would be the new hire, which is exactly what this article is about. The lowest performer, however, is the most loyal, and the strongest political player. Now imagine that they vote for the best performer to become their boss. The most loyal person is getting elected for that role.